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1. Introduction 
 
The importance of cyberspace in today’s interconnected and highly complex world 
cannot be overstated. It has become central for the smooth running of the world 
economy, the carrying out of daily business transactions, political communications, as 
well as for social networking. The late 1990s saw an exponential growth in the use of 
the Internet with over 2.5 billion users across the world today.1  
 
While in general the development of cyberspace has undoubtedly proved to be in an 
immensely positive development, its rise has also been accompanied by a more 
sinister side, in that the development of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) has given rise to various risks to individuals, societies and states more broadly. 
Although ‘governments have attempted to address these issues by creating national-
level mechanisms, the very transnational nature of cyberspace has forced the 
international community to debate and form norms or rules that should promote good 
behavior in cyberspace.’ 2  Activity in this respect has been occurring in various 
institutional and regional forums for some time. For example, the OSCE’s Budapest 
Convention on Cybercrime entered into force in 2004 and is seen as a positive 
precedent in the regulation of this element of cyber-security.3  
 
Activity within the UN to address cyber-security issues begun when the Russian 
Federation introduced a draft resolution into the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 
1998 on ‘[d]evelopments in the field of information and telecommunications in the 
context of international security’.4 Subsequent initial activity within the UN proved 
somewhat ‘dull without much movement … towards dealing with issues in 
cyberspace’.5 Yet, ‘mounting reports of disruptions and the increasing potential of 
cyber attacks disturbing the peace in the real world led countries to examine these 
                                                
* The author wishes to thank April Longstaffe for her research assistance in preparing this chapter. 
1 World Internet Usage and Population Statistics, Internet World Stats, 30 June 2012, available at 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. 
2 R. Prakesh and D.M. Baruah, ‘The UN and Cyberspace Governance’, ORF Issue Brief, February 
2014, at 1, available at 
http://orfonline.org/cms/export/orfonline/modules/issuebrief/attachments/issuebrief68_1394871027354
.pdf. 
3  Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG. 
4 UNGA A/RES/53/70, 4 December 1998.  
5 Prakesh and Baruah, supra n.2, at 1.  
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challenges more seriously within the UN.’6 Indeed, the Distributed Denial of Service 
Attacks (DDoS) on Estonia (2007) and Georgia (2008), the Stuxnet worm attack upon 
Iran (2010) and the Edward Snowden revelations (2013) regarding the use of ICTs by 
states to spy upon one another brought to light in dramatic fashion the realities of 
cyberspace being used in unscrupulous ways and raised the profile of cyber-security 
on the UN’s agenda. In light of these events, it is fair to say that ‘[t]he issue of cyber 
security is quickly making its way up the agenda of global public policy issues 
demanding attention.’7  
 
While one might, nonetheless, take the view that ‘[t]here has been only limited U.N. 
action on the issue of cyber-security’,8 this is arguably down to the fact that there have 
been fundamental differences on fundamental issues between Eastern and Western 
states. The main sticking points appear to be whether there should be a free flow of 
information or whether there should be governmental restrictions upon it; whether the 
focus should be on economic espionage and criminal activity or upon the use of 
cyberspace to carry out attacks; and whether existing international law applies to 
cyber-security issues or whether new rules and norms need to be developed, perhaps 
in the form of a new treaty. In this respect, the UN ‘has been working for over a 
decade to eliminate these differences and create a mechanism to ensure the security 
and stability of cyberspace.’ 9  As this chapter will attempt to highlight, the UN, 
through its work on both issues of cyber warfare and cyber crime,10 is now moving 
with some momentum.  
 
The UN’s activities in this area are highly fragmented with a very complex system of 
bodies dealing with it and with expertise scattered throughout the system meaning that 
a full analysis is beyond the limited scope of this chapter. The purpose of this chapter 
is thus twofold. Its primary aim is to provide an overview of UN activities and 
initiatives concerning the regulation of cyberspace and cyber-security. The chapter 
also attempts to discern whether any regulatory norms have emerged in this field of 
activity. While it will touch upon issues such as the use of force in cyberspace and 
cybercrime, these have been dealt with in-depth in other chapters of this Handbook.11 
 
 
2. The United Nations General Assembly 
 
While the UNGA may in several respects be considered as the second organ of the 
UN in regards to the maintenance of international peace and security, and can only 
make recommendations as opposed to legally oblige states to take a particular course 
of action,12 it has nonetheless been central in the process of norm development in the 
                                                
6 Ibid., at 1-2.  
7 P. Meyer, ‘Cyber Security Takes the Floor at the UN’, opencanada.org, 12 November 2013, available 
at http://opencanada.org/features/the-think-tank/comments/cyber-security-takes-the-floor-at-the-un/. 
8 O.A. Hathaway et al, ‘The law of cyber-attack’ (2012) 100 California Law Review 817, at 865. 
9 Prakesh and Baruah, supra n.2, at 1. 
10 While there is an obvious overlap between the two, cyber-warfare is mainly concerned with how 
‘[information] technologies and means can potentially be used for purposes that are inconsistent with 
the objectives of maintaining international stability and security and may adversely affect the security 
of States’ (see A/RES/53/70) while cyber-crime, on the other hand, is concerned in general with ‘the 
criminal misuse of information technologies’ (See A/RES/55/63).  
11 See Chapters ????. 
12 Arts 10-17, UN Charter (1945). 
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context of cyber-security. The main discursive work of the UNGA occurs in its 
various committees, of which there are six. 13  Three out of the UNGA’s six 
committees have met to discuss the issue of cyber-security and negotiate draft 
resolutions in relation to it, which were then submitted to the plenary for adoption at 
the UNGA’s annual session each year. 
 
 
2.1. The First Committee 
 
The First Committee of the UNGA – the Disarmament and International Security 
Committee – is concerned with disarmament and related international security 
questions and was the first committee to engage with issues of cyber security. Indeed, 
the issue of information security has been on the agenda of the UN since 1998 when 
the Russian Federation introduced its draft resolution in the First Committee on 
‘[d]evelopments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of 
international security’, which was subsequently adopted without a vote. 14  This 
resolution built upon previous work on the ‘[r]ole of science and technology in the 
context of security, disarmament and other related fields’15 and has been subsequently 
introduced every year since. Its key elements are that it: 
 
• mentions the dual use of developments in the area and the military potential of 
ICTs for the first time;16 
 
• expresses concern about the use of such technology ‘inconsistent with the 
objectives of maintaining international stability and security’;17 
 
• noted the need for broad international cooperation;18 
 
• called upon Member States to promote at multilateral levels the consideration 
of existing and potential threats in the field of information security;19 
 
• mentions the need to prevent cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism;20 and 
 
• invitesd Member States to inform the UN Secretary-General of their views 
regarding ‘definitions and the development of ‘international principles’.21 
 
In introducing this resolution, Sergey Ivanov, Minister of Defense of the Russian 
Federation from 2001 to 2007, stated that ‘Russia want[ed] to develop international 
                                                
13  The six main committees of the UNGA are: First Committee (Disarmament and International 
Security Committee),  Second Committee (Economic and Financial Committee), Third Committee 
(Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee), Fourth Committee (Special Political and 
Decolonization Committee), Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary Committee), and Sixth 
Committee (Legal Committee). 
14 UNGA A/RES/53/70, 4 December 1998. 
15 UNGA A/53/576, 18 November 1998.  
16 UNGA A/RES/53/70, supra n.14, preamble. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., para.1. 
20 Ibid., preamble. 
21 Ibid., at para. 2. 
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law regimes for preventing the use of information technologies for purposes 
incompatible with missions of ensuring international stability and security’. 22 
However, the US has always taken, and as noted below continues to take, the position 
that ‘[t]he same laws that apply to the use of kinetic weapons should apply to state 
behaviour in cyberspace’ while trying to increase cooperation among law enforcement 
agencies.23 In this respect, the original push by Russia for what was perceived as an 
international treaty was met with suspicion by the US and EU states in the belief that 
a treaty could be used to limit the freedom of information under the guise of 
increasing information and telecommunications security.24 
 
Yet, while the idea of an international treaty to regulate cyberspace was divisive, this 
did not impact upon general support for the resolution itself. Indeed, in 2005, an 
important change took place in the First Committee in that the draft resolution that 
had been introduced into the UNGA annually by Russia was adopted but went to a 
recorded vote.25 The US was the only state to vote against the resolution.26 Arguably 
as a result of US opposition the draft resolution introduced in 2006 was no longer 
sponsored by Russia alone, but also co-sponsored by China, Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.27 Additional states 
joined as co-sponsors in subsequent years.28  
 
However, after President Obama had succeeded President Bush as President of the 
United States in 2009 the US adopted a ‘reset’ policy not only with regards to Russia 
but also with the UN itself.29 The US subsequently initially agreed to discuss cyber-
warfare and cyber-security with representatives of the First Committee.30 In January 
2010, President Obama then presented a position paper with the objective of bringing 
the two parties together31 and, later that year, the US went on to reverse its long-time 
policy position towards the annually introduced resolution and for the first time 
became a co-sponsor of the draft resolution.32 Yet, this did not mean that the US had 
fully aligned itself with the position of the Russian Federation. On the contrary, there 
were two key changes to the 2010 draft from the original draft of the resolution: 
 
• omission of the reference to, and attempts to come up with, definitions that 
were perceived as a first-step towards a cyber arms control treaty; and 
 
                                                
22  C.A. Ford, ‘The Trouble with Cyber Arms Control’, (2010) The New Atlantis: A Journal of 
Technology & Society 52, at 65. 
23 Ibid., at 67. 
24 China was initially relatively quiet on this issue but subsequently appeared to align itself with the 
position of Russia.  
25 See UNGA A/60/452. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See UNGA A/C.1/61/L.35. 
28 UNGA A/61/389. 
29 T. Maurer, ‘Cyber Norm Emergence at the United Nations: An Analysis of the Activities of the UN 
Regarding Cyber-Security’, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Discussion Paper 
#2011-11), September 2011, at 23, available at http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-
norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., at 24. 
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• substitution of the reference to ‘international principles’ with references to 
what was perceived as more benign language in the form of ‘international 
concepts’ and ‘possible measures’. 
 
While the resolution, albeit with certain amendments,33 continues to be introduced in 
the UNGA each year, the main work of the First Committee and the focus of its 
resolutions has centered on the work of several Groups of Governmental Experts 
(GGEs), which will be addressed below. Before doing so, it should not be forgotten 
that work on the issue of cyber-security has also been undertaken in the Second and 
Third Committees of the UNGA. 
 
 
2.2. The Second Committee 
 
The Second Committee – the Economic and Financial Committee – is concerned with 
economic questions, so might not immediately be seen to be relevant in discussions 
regarding cybersecurity. However, while it is fair to say that the First Committee has 
tended to focus upon issues of cyber warfare and the Third Committee upon issues of 
cyber crime,34 the Second Committee has addressed both through its ‘Global Culture 
of Cyber-security’ initiative. The three resolutions of the UNGA’s Second Committee 
on this initiative are concerned with both cyber warfare and cyber crime and all 
reference the resolutions of both the First and Third Committees.35  
 
In light of the decision of the Third Committee to no longer focus on cyber-crime, the 
US introduced a new draft resolution in the Second Committee in 2002 entitled 
‘[c]reation of a global culture of cyber-security’. While initially co-sponsored by 
Japan, Australia and Norway, after a number of revisions to the original draft 36 other 
Member States joined as co-sponsors, including the Russian Federation.36 Indeed, one 
of the revisions was to introduce references to resolutions adopted within the UNGA’s 
First Committee, which had, as noted above, been mainly drafted by Russia. It was 
subsequently adopted without a vote.37  
 
There were several significant elements to this original resolution. First, in order to 
attract the support of many developing countries the resolution had a focus on 
capacity-building, which was something that the GGEs subsequently put much store 
by. 38  The preamble noted, for example, that ‘gaps in access to and the use of 
information technologies by States can diminish the effectiveness of international 
cooperation in combating the criminal use of information technology’ while the final 
operative paragraph ‘[s]tresse[d] the necessity to facilitate the transfer of information 
technology and capacity-building to developing countries, in order to help them to 
take measures in cybersecurity.’39 Secondly, the resolution had annexed to it a series 
                                                
33  For example, the inclusion of references to the importance of respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the use of information and communications technologies, the need to address 
threats consistent with the free flow of information, and references to the various initiatives of the UN 
Secretary-General and the responses of Member States. 
34 See sections 2.1 and 2.3 of this chapter respectively. 
35 UNGA A/RES/57/239; UNGA A/RES/58/199; UNGA A/RES/64/211. 
36 UNGA A/57/529/Add.3. China did not co-sponsor the resolution. 
37 UNGA A/RES57/239.  
38 See section 2.4 of this chapter. 
39 UNGA A/RES/57/239, para.5 
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of ‘[e]lements for creating a global culture of cybersecurity’, which Member States 
were invited to take into account.40 These elements covered nine areas: awareness, 
responsibility, response, ethics, democracy, risk assessment, security design and 
implementation, security management, and reassessment.41 While these were titled 
‘principles’, as opposed to ‘elements’, in the original draft, along with the fact that 
they were originally due to be ‘adopted’ but which was later changed so that Member 
States were to simply take them ‘into account’, they nonetheless arguably represented 
a certain consensus regarding regulatory norms in the context of cyber security.42 
 
These ‘elements’ were expanded upon in the second resolution of the Second 
Committee on the creation of a global culture of cybersecurity, that was adopted by 
the UNGA in January 2005, with the addition of the ‘protection of critical information 
infrastructures’. 43  These elements included actions such as having emergency 
networks regarding cyber-vulnerabilities, threats and incidents, 44  examining 
information infrastructures and the interdependencies between them, 45  promoting 
partnerships, including the sharing of information, between public and private 
stakeholders,46 having adequate substantive and procedural laws and trained personnel 
to enable effective investigations and prosecutions in response to attacks, 47  and 
engaging in international cooperation to secure critical information infrastructures.48 
The resolution, and the included elements, was co-sponsored by 69 countries, this 
time including China but not Russia.49 Nonetheless, the broadening of the elements 
could be perceived as a progressive step towards the formation of a regulatory cyber-
security regime.50 
 
The final resolution was adopted in 2010 after the US policy shift.51 It was sponsored 
by the US on behalf of 39 states, although not Russia or China. This resolution was 
titled the ‘[c]reation of a global culture of cybersecurity and taking stock of national 
efforts to protect critical information infrastructures’ and included an annex outlining 
a ‘[v]oluntary self-assessment tool for national efforts to protect critical information 
infrastructures’. This is explained as ‘a voluntary tool that may be used by Member 
States, in part or in its entirety, if and when they deem appropriate, in order to assist in 
their efforts to protect their critical information infrastructures and strengthen their 
cybersecurity.’52 These include ‘[t]aking stock of cybersecurity needs and strategies’, 
‘[s]takeholder roles and responsibilites’, ‘[p]olicy processes and participation’, 
‘[p]ublic-private cooperation’, ‘[i]ncident management and recovery’, ‘[l]egal 
frameworks’, and ‘[d]eveloping a global culture of cybersecurity’.53 Notably, these 
                                                
40 Ibid., para.3.  
41 Ibid., appendix. 
42 Maurer, supra n.29, at 44. 
43 UNGA A/RES/58/199. See appendix for the expanded elements. 
44 Ibid., annex, element 1. 
45 Ibid., annex, element 3. 
46 Ibid., annex, element 4. 
47 Ibid., annex, element 9. 
48 Ibid., annex, element 10. 
49 UNGA A/58/481/Add.2. 
50 Maurer, supra n.29, at 44. 
51 UNGA A/RES/64/211. 
52 Ibid., n.2. 
53 Ibid., annex. 
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highlight the importance of cooperation among states, including through ‘international 
information-sharing and collaboration’.54 
 
 
2.3. The Third Committee 
 
The Third Committee – the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee – is, as its 
title suggests, concerned mainly with social and humanitarian issues, but in the 
context of cyber-security with cyber crime. Two years after the Russian Federation 
introduced its resolution in the First Committee in 1998 the Third Committee 
discussed a draft resolution introduced by the US and 38 other states entitled 
‘[c]ombating the criminal misuse of information technologies’.55 It was co-sponsored 
by the Russian Federation, but not China, with a further 19 Member States 
subsequently co-sponsoring it and was adopted without a vote on 22 January 2001.56  
 
The key objective of this resolution was to establish a ‘legal basis for combating the 
criminal use of information technologies’.57 In attempting to realize this objective, the 
resolution had several key elements. First, it ‘recogniz[ed] that the free flow of 
information can promote economic and social development, education and democratic 
governance’. 58  Second, it ‘[e]xpress[ed] concern that technological advancements 
ha[d] created new possibilities for criminal activity, in particular the criminal misuse 
of information technologies’. 59  Third, it ‘recogniz[ed] the need for cooperation 
between States and private industry in combating the criminal misuses of information 
technologies’.60 Lastly, it noted the value of 10 measures to combat the criminal 
misuse of information technologies including, inter alia, eliminating safe havens for 
those who criminally misuse information technologies,61 law enforcement cooperation 
amongst concerned states,62  information sharing,63  the appropriate training of law 
enforcement personnel,64 protecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
data and computer systems and ensuring criminal misuse is penalized, 65  the 
preservation of and quick access to electronic data pertaining to particular criminal 
investigations,66 the timely investigation and exchange of evidence of the criminal 
misuse of information technologies,67  increasing public awareness of the need to 
prevent and combat, criminality in this area, 68  the designing of information 
technologies to help detect and prevent criminal misuse, trace criminals and collective 
evidence,69 the development of solutions taking into account both the protection of 
                                                
54 Ibid., preamble. 
55 UNGA A/55/59, 16 November 2000.  
56 UNGA A/RES/55/63. 
57 UNGA A/57/529/Add.3. 
58 UNGA A/RES/55/63, preamble. 
59 Ibid., preamble. 
60 Ibid., preamble. 
61 Ibid., para. 1(a). 
62 Ibid., para. 1(b). 
63 Ibid., para. 1(c). 
64 Ibid., para. 1(d). 
65 Ibid., para. 1(e). 
66 Ibid., para. 1(f). 
67 Ibid., para. 1(g). 
68 Ibid., para. 1(h). 
69 Ibid., para. 1(i). 
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individual freedoms and privacy and the preservation of the capacity of Governments 
to fight such criminal misuse.70 
 
In 2001, a follow-up resolution – again, entitled ‘[c]ombating the criminal misuse of 
information technologies’ – was introduced by the US and 73 other Member States, 
again including the Russian Federation but not China, with eight Member States 
joining later, and was adopted without a vote on 23 January 2002.71 This took note of 
the measure set forth above, and again invited Member States to take them into 
account in their efforts to combat the criminal misuse of information technologies.72 
 
Several resolutions, sponsored by Italy, titled ‘[s]trengthening the United Nations 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme, in particular its technical 
cooperation capacity’ drew attention to the issue of ‘cyber crime’ and ‘the use of new 
information technologies to abuse and exploit children’, and ‘invite[ed] the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to explore, within its mandate, ways and means of 
addressing these issues.’73 
 
Lastly, the Third Committee adopted a resolution in 2013 titled ‘[t]he right to privacy 
in the digital age’.74 The Edward Snowden revelations earlier in the year were a key 
reason for the adoption of this resolution. It was in this sense no surprise that its two 
key sponsors were Brazil and Germany, the leaders of which were the main victims of 
NSA surveillance operations. While it was first thought that the response of these two 
states would be ‘an initiative on the international security front at the UN, in the end, 
Brazil and Germany decided it was best to present the matter in the context of respect 
for international human rights law and the right to privacy in particular.’75 In this 
regard, the resolution emphasizes that ‘illegal surveillance of communications, their 
interception and the illegal collection of personal data constitute a highly intrusive act 
that violates the right to privacy and freedom of expression and may threaten the 
foundations of a democratic society’.76 The resolution recalls the obligation of states 
to ‘ensure that measures taken to counter terrorism comply with international law’ and 
recalls the privacy provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.77 The resolution calls 
upon states ‘to take measures to put an end to violations of those rights’78 and, in 
doing so, ‘establish independent national oversight mechanisms capable of ensuring 
transparency and accountability of state surveillance of communications, their 
interception and collection of personal data’.79 The resolution also requests that the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reports ‘on the protection of the right to 
privacy in the context of domestic and extraterritorial surveillance of 
communications, their interception and collection of personal data’ and for a final 
                                                
70 Ibid., para. 1(j). 
71 UNGA A/RES/56/121. 
72 Ibid., para.2 
73 UNGA A/RES/63/195 (2008), UNGA A/RES/64/179 (2009), UNGA A/RES/65/232 (2010), UNGA 
A/RES/66/181 (2011), UNGA A/RES/67/189 (2012), and UNGA A/RES/68/193 (2013). 
74 UNGA A/RES/68/167. 
75 Meyer, supra n.7. 
76 UNGA A/RES/68/167, preamble. 
77 Ibid., preamble. 
78 Ibid., para. 4(b). 
79 Ibid., para. 4(d). 
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report to be submitted by the High Commissioner to the 2015 session of the General 
Assembly.80 
 
While this was an undoubted important development in the context of cyber-security, 
it is also arguably true that ‘[t]he difficult political and legal questions underlying 
references to “unlawful interference with privacy” and constraints on “extraterritorial 
surveillance” will keep lawyers and diplomats busy for months if not years to 
come.’81 
 
 
2.4. The Groups of Governmental Experts 
 
Overall, and as demonstrated by the above sections, the UNGA has been active in 
regards to discussing principles, elements, good practice, etc regarding the behavior of 
Member States in the context of cyber security. However, what the above also 
arguably shows is that ‘[a]t the multilateral level, the UN will have to begin to address 
the cyber security issue in a more coherent fashion.  The General Assembly can ill 
afford to have two deliberative streams (i.e. the First and Third Committee) acting in 
ignorance of one another.’82 Indeed, ‘[t]he airing of declaratory policy at the annual 
General Assembly sessions should not substitute for purposeful action by states in 
more operational forums to tackle the pressing problems raised by destabilizing state 
conducted cyber operations.’83 In this respect, the establishment of several Groups of 
Governmental Experts has been a significant development. Four GGEs have been 
established since 2004 that have examined the existing and potential threats from the 
cyber-sphere and possible cooperative measures to address them. The purpose of this 
section is to give an overview of the work of these Groups. 
 
 
2.4.1. The First Group of Governmental Experts 
 
The first GGE was established in 2004 by the UNGA’s First Committee. The previous 
year, following on from a proposal by Russia,84 Member States had: 
 
‘Request[ed] the Secretary-General to consider existing and potential threats 
in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to 
address them, and to conduct a study on [relevant international concepts aimed 
at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications 
systems], with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, to be 
established in 2004, appointed by him on the basis of equitable geographical 
distribution and with the help of Member States in a position to render such 
                                                
80 Ibid., para. 5. 
81 Meyer, supra n.7. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Russia noted in its report to the UN Secretary-General that ‘the group will give the international 
community a unique opportunity to examine the entire range of issues involved’. ‘Developments in the 
field of information and telecommunications in the context of information security’, Report to the 
Secretary General, United Nations General Assembly, 58th Session, Addendum, A/58/373, 17 
September 2003. 
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assistance, and to submit a report on the outcome of the study to the General 
Assembly at its sixtieth session.’85 
 
Yet, over the course of three meetings the GGE failed to even find the smallest 
common denominator. It is perhaps quite unusual for such an outcome to occur at the 
UN where an activity is usually only initiated when it is clear before it starts that there 
is at least some smallest denominator that everyone can agree on.86 Yet, the UN 
Secretary-General concluded in 2005 that it was due to ‘the complexity of the issues 
involved’ that ‘no consensus was reached on the preparation of a final report’.87  
 
A member of the Russia delegation at the GGE meetings claimed that ‘[t]he main 
stumbling block was the question of whether international humanitarian law and 
international law sufficiently regulate the security aspects of international relations in 
cases of “hostile” use of ICTs for politicomilitary purposes.’88 The issue of whether 
existing law sufficiently regulated cyber threats is, as noted above, something that was 
an issue between Russia and the US. While Moscow urged the development of new 
norms and rules Washington was of the opinion that ‘the law of armed conflict and its 
principles of necessity, proportionality and limitation of collateral damage already 
govern the use of such technologies.’89 
 
Furthermore, the group was not able to agree on whether the discussions should focus 
on ‘information content or information infrastructures’.90 The US and EU were, as 
noted above, suspicious of the motives of Russia, more specifically that it was 
attempting to limit the freedom of information under the guise of increasing 
information and telecommunications security. Washington had clear concerns 
regarding any ‘extension to governments of the right to approve or ban information 
transmitted into national territory from outside its borders should it be deemed 
disruptive politically, socially or culturally’.91 Indeed, ‘US apprehensions stemmed 
from concerns that authoritarian regimes would attempt to control the free flow of 
information using such a mechanism and restrict freedom of speech and expression.’92 
 
However, despite the lack of agreement, ‘the work of the GGE was not in vain as it 
successfully raised the profile of the relevant issues on the international agenda.’93 In 
                                                
85 ‘Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international 
security’, UNGA A/RES/58/32, 8 December 2003, (on the report of the First Committee), para.4. The 
eventual GGE consisted of governmental experts from 15 States: Belarus, Brazil, China, France, 
Germany, India, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Russia, South Africa, UK, 
and US. They unanimously elected Andrey V. Krutskikh of Russia as its Chairman. 
86 Maurer, supra n. 29, at 22. 
87 UNGA A/60/202, at 2. 
88 Maurer, supra n.29, at 22. 
89 ‘Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of information 
security’, Report to the Secretary General, United Nations General Assembly, 59th Session, Addendum, 
A/59/116/Add.1, 28 December 2004. 
90 Fact Sheet – Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, available at http://unoda-
web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Information_Security_Fact_Sheet.pdf 
91 ‘Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of information 
security’, Report to the Secretary General, United Nations General Assembly, 59th Session, Addendum, 
A/59/116/Add.1, 28 December 2004. 
92 Prakesh and Baruah, supra n.2, at 2. 
93 Maurer, supra n.29, at 22. 
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addition, despite its notable failure the first GGE had initiated a certain momentum 
within the UN to consider cyber security. As such, during the sixtieth session of the 
UNGA, when the first GGE had been due to report, Member States adopted a 
resolution in which they 
 
‘Request[ed] the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of 
governmental experts, to be established in 2009 on the basis of equitable 
geographical distribution, to continue to study existing and potential threats in 
the sphere of information security and possible cooperative measures to 
address them, as well as the [relevant international concepts aimed at 
strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications 
systems], and to submit a report on the results of this study to the General 
Assembly at its sixty-fifth session’.94 
  
The momentum that had developed as a result of the GGE initiative could only be 
increased by the fact that between the adoption of the resolution in 2005 requesting 
the establishment of a second GGE and its actual establishment in 2009 cyber-warfare 
had begun to make the headlines, with the DDoS attack against Estonia in 2007 and 
then, in 2008, with cyber conflict issues during the Georgian-Russian war.95 Yet, 
these events did not mean that agreement amongst the second group of experts was 
assured. On the contrary, given the intensity of the situations and the parties involved 
things might equally have gone the other way. As it happened, however, a consensus 
began to emerge within the group with the inclusion in its report of some progressive 
steps. 
 
 
2.4.2. The Second Group of Governmental Experts 
 
Given the intervening events it was interesting that Estonia was a member of the 
second GGE,96 having been the first state to suffer a massive DDoS attack. The GGE, 
having first convened in November 2009, met four times and in July 2010 issued the 
first successful report of a GGE.97  It is clear that with the issuance of this report the 
UN took ‘a step forward’ in its regulation of cyber security. 98   In coming to a 
consensus the group was of the view that ‘[e]xisting and potential threats in the sphere 
of information security are among the most serious challenges of the twenty-first 
century.’99 Indeed, the threat was considered significant enough to pose a threat to 
‘international peace and national security’.100 It recalled some of the existing efforts to 
                                                
94 UNGA A/RES/60/45, 8 December 2005, para. 4 (emphasis added). 
95 It is perhaps worth noting that the classification of these two incidents as examples of ‘cyber-
warfare’ is not absolutely certain and is still dependent to an extent on the emerging consensus as to 
how to classify such incidents. See, in general, M. Schmitt, Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
96  The eventual GGE consisted of governmental experts from 15 States: Belarus, Brazil, China, 
Estonia, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Russia, South Africa, UK, 
and US. Mr. Andrey V. Krutskikh (Russia) was unanimously elected to Chair the Group. 
97 UNGA A/65/201. 
98 Hathaway et al, supra n. 8, at 49.  
99 UNGA A/65/201, at 2. 
100 Ibid. 
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combat the criminal use of information technology and noted the intention to create a 
‘global culture of cyber security’.101  
 
In adding some flesh to the bones of this statement the report highlighted the ‘dual 
use’ character of cyber-space.102 Indeed, the notion that the Internet is ‘neutral’ so that 
the use to which it is put and the consequences of this are dependent upon the intent 
of its user is a recurring theme of resolutions of the UNGA.103 It also identified 
criminals, terrorists, and states as potential perpetrators of offences in cyber space 
while individuals, businesses, national infrastructures, and governments as potential 
victims.104 Importantly, and arguably as a result of the events in Estonia, the report 
also acknowledged the attribution problem in connection with cyber attacks.105 Given 
the impasse between the US and the Russian Federation in regards to the utility of 
existing international law in addressing cyber security or whether further rules and 
norms should be developed, it was perhaps of no surprise that the report equivocally 
noted that ‘[e]xisting agreements include norms relevant to the use of ICTs by States’ 
although ‘[g]iven the unique attributes of ICTs, additional norms could be developed 
over time.’106 
 
Arguably the most significant development in the report of the second GGE, however, 
were the five recommendations it made ‘for the development of confidence-building 
and other measures to reduce the risk of misperception resulting from ICT 
disruptions’107: 
 
• Dialogue among States to discuss norms pertaining to State use of ICTs, to 
reduce collective risk and protect critical national and international 
infrastructures; 
 
• Confidence-building, stability, and risk reduction measures to address the 
implications of State use of ICTs, including exchanges of national views 
on the use of ICTs in conflict; 
 
• Information exchanges on national legislation, national ICT security 
strategies and technologies, policies and best practices; 
 
• Identification of measures to support capacity-building in less developed 
countries; and 
 
• The elaboration of common terms and definitions in connection with 
information security   
 
With these recommendations, the GGE had begun to cement four progressive themes 
of an emerging regulatory framework for cyber-security within the UNGA: common 
understandings of acceptable state behaviour, practical cooperation, confidence-
                                                
101 Ibid., at 7. For more on this concept see section 2.2. above on the work of the Second Committee. 
102 Ibid., at 6. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid., 8. 
107 Ibid., 8. 
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building measures, and capacity-building measures. Though perhaps vague, and as the 
UN Secretary-General noted the international community had ‘only begun to develop 
the norms, laws and modes of cooperation needed’, 108  ‘these recommendations 
represent real progress in overcoming a long impasse between the United States and 
Russia over how to address cybersecurity issues. The cooperation may even suggest 
possibilities for a future multilateral treaty under the auspices of the United Nations, 
which Russia has been advocating for some time.’109 
 
However, in 2010, the year in which the report had been issued and during which time 
the major WikiLeaks releases occurred and the Stuxnet attack against Iran had begun 
to unfold, a further important turning point arose in enabling the work of the UN to 
progress further and, in particular, establish further cooperation and normative 
understandings. Indeed, as noted above, it was at this point that the US decided to 
engage with other states to address the concerns it had over cyberspace and, in 
particular, for the first time to co-sponsor the Russian draft resolution in the First 
Committee.110  Overall, the US’s ‘support of the UN resolution of 2009 (co-sponsored 
with Russia) as well as the successful completion of the second GGE were signs 
indicting this change.’111 Furthermore, and in an attempt to build upon the substantial 
progress made in the report of the second GGE, the 2010 version of the resolution 
also included a new request to the Secretary-General to establish a further GGE in 
2012 which was to submit a report at the 68th session of the UNGA in 2013.112 
 
 
2.4.3. The Third Group of Governmental Experts 
 
The third GGE was tasked with building upon the assessments and recommendations 
contained in the report of the second GGE and continuing to study existing and 
potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible cooperative 
measures to address them.113 The GGE had three one week meetings, the first was 
held in New York in August 2012, the second in Geneva in January 2013, and the last 
in June 2013 in New York and issued its report on 7 June 2013.114 
 
                                                
108 Ibid., 4. 
109 Hathaway, supra n.8, at 50. 
110 UNGA A/RES/65/41, 8 December 2010. The resolution was sponsored by three dozen counties 
including China. 
111 Prakesh and Baruah, supra n.2, at 4.  
112 UNGA A/RES/65/41, para. 4. Similar to previous resolutions noted above, this paragraph stated that 
the UN Member states ‘Request[ed] the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of 
governmental experts, to be established in 2012 on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, 
taking into account the assessments and recommendations contained in the above-mentioned report, to 
continue to study existing and potential threats in the sphere of information security and possible 
cooperative measures to address them, as well as [relevant international concepts aimed at 
strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems], and to submit a 
report on the results of this study to the Assembly at its sixty-eighth session.’ Again, in 2011 the 
UNGA unanimously approved a resolution calling for a follow up to the last GGE (See UNGA 
A/RES/66/24). 
113  The following Member States participated in the GGE: Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Canada, 
China, Egypt, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, UK and USA. Ms. Deborah 
Stokes (Australia) was unanimously elected to Chair the Group.  
114 UNGA A/68/98, 24 June 2013. 
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Forming a backdrop to the meetings of the GGE, in 2011 China, Russia, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan requested the UN Secretary-General to distribute to the 66th session 
of the UNGA an International Code of Conduct for Information Security which they 
had drafted, and which was an attempt to provide further regulation to cyber norms 
and governance.115 In describing this document, China stated that it was ‘a series of 
basic principles of maintaining information and network security which cover the 
political, military, economic, social, cultural, technical and other aspects.’ 116  The 
Code suggested creating a multilateral mechanism in the form of a treaty to govern 
the Internet, something which, as noted above, had been vehemently opposed by the 
US. In response to the distribution of the Code of Conduct the US commented that 
‘[a]t its heart, it calls for multilateral governance of the Internet that would replace the 
multistakeholder approach, where all users have a voice, with top-down control and 
regulation by states.’117 
 
The Code reflected the concerns of its sponsor states, in particular it restricted its 
signatories from using ‘ICTs including networks to carry out hostile activities or acts 
of aggression and pose threats to international peace and security. Not to proliferate 
information weapons and related technologies’. 118  However, the US was of the 
opinion that 
 
‘the draft Code appears to propose replacing existing international law that 
governs the use of force and relations among states in armed conflict with 
new, unclear, and ill-defined rules and concepts. Indeed, one of the primary 
sponsors of the draft Code has stated repeatedly that long-standing provisions 
of international law, including elements of jus ad bellum and jus in bello that 
would provide a legal framework for the way that states could use force in 
cyberspace, have no applicability. This position is not justified in international 
law and risks creating instability by wrongly suggesting the Internet is an 
ungoverned space to which existing law does not apply.’119 
 
Furthermore, the Code suggested ‘that policy authority for Internet-related public 
issues is the sovereign right of States, which have rights and responsibilities for 
international Internet-related public policy issues’. The Code contained clauses 
curbing ‘dissemination of information which incites terrorism, secessionism, 
extremism or undermines other countries’ political, economic and social stability, as 
well as their spiritual and cultural environment’.120 However, the US was clear that  
 
‘the introduction of a draft Code of Conduct for Information Security 
presented an alternative view that seeks to establish international justification 
for government control over Internet resources. … It would legitimize the 
                                                
115 UNGA A/66/359, see appendix.  
116 China, Russia and Other Countries Submit the Document of International Code of Conduct for 
Information Security to the United Nations, Foreign Ministry of People’s Republic of China, 13 
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117  Statement by Delegation of the United States of America, ‘Other Disarmament Issues and 
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of the United Nations General Assembly’, 2 November 2013, available at 
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/200050.htm. 
118 International Code of Conduct for Information Security, supra n.16. 
119 Statement by Delegation of the United States of America, supra n.117. 
120 International Code of Conduct for Information Security, supra n.16. 
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view that the right to freedom of expression can be limited by national laws 
and cultural proclivities, thereby undermining that right as described in the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights.’121 
 
Ultimately, there was little support for the draft Code of Conduct which had little 
impact upon the report of the third GGE. However, the third GGE ‘made significant 
progress on agreeing on some of the defining aspects’ of cyber security.122 As with 
the report of the second GGE and resolutions of the three committees of the UNGA, 
the report again noted the immense benefits brought by ICTs but also recognized their 
dual-use capabilities in that they could be used ‘for purposes that are inconsistent with 
international peace and security’.123 Similarly, it again noted the problem whereby the 
actors involved ‘often act with impunity’ and their malicious use of ICTs ‘is easily 
concealed and attribution to a specific perpetrator can be difficult.’124 
 
The report then focused on building upon the four progressive themes of the emerging 
regulatory framework for cyber-security within the UNGA: practical cooperation, 
common understandings of acceptable state behaviour, confidence-building measures, 
and capacity-building measures, and offered recommendations in respect to each 
including the important role of the private sector and civil society in any efforts. 
Where perhaps the report made most progress, however, was in its recommendations 
on ‘norms, rules and principles of responsible behavior by States’. It was first noted 
that ‘[t]he application of norms derived from existing international law relevant to the 
use of ICTs by States is an essential measure to reduce risks to international peace, 
security and stability.’125 This was important, given the debate noted above between 
the US and the Russian Federation on this issue. If the report had left it at that 
question marks would have remained over what the GGE had meant when it referred 
to ‘existing international law’. However, it went on to note that ‘international law and 
in particular the United Nations Charter, is applicable and is essential to maintaining 
peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT 
environment.’126 This affirmation of the UN Charter, and perhaps in particular its 
rules on the non-use of force and self-defence, was significant. As the report noted 
further, ‘State sovereignty and the international norms and principles that flow from 
sovereignty apply to State conduct of ICT-related activities, and to their jurisdiction 
over ICT infrastructure within their territory.’127 
 
On this subject, the report was also clear that ‘State efforts to address the security of 
ICTs must go hand-in-hand with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international 
instruments’.128 This was a significant step that allayed some of the fears of Western 
states in regards to attempts by certain states to curb free use of the Internet. Lastly on 
the subject of the applicability of existing international law the report noted that 
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‘States must meet their international obligations regarding internationally wrongful 
acts attributable to them.’129 
 
However, the report was clear that further work was needed in this context. Indeed, it 
stressed, again, that ‘[c]ommon understandings on how such norms shall apply to 
State behavior and the use of ICTs by States requires further study.’130 What was also 
notable was its recognition that ‘[g]iven the unique attributes of ICTs, additional 
norms could be developed over time’, something which was arguably attributable to 
the efforts of some states to do just that.131 
 
In his forward to the new report, the UN Secretary-General noted the ‘broad 
recognition that misuse [of ICTs] poses risks to international peace and security’.   
However, he also specifically 
 
‘appreciate[d] the report’s focus on the centrality of the Charter of the United 
Nations and international law as well as the importance of States exercising 
responsibility. The recommendations point the way forward for anchoring ICT 
security in the existing framework of international law and understandings that 
govern State relations and provide the foundation for international peace and 
security.”132 
 
On 27 December 2013, the UNGA unanimously adopted a resolution in which it took 
note of the outcome of the third GGE, although did not specifically reiterate the 
conclusion that existing international law applies to cyber space.133 It also requested 
the Secretary-General to establish a further GGE that would report to the UNGA in 
2015 and would study, in addition to threats and cooperative measures, the issues of 
the use of ICTs in conflicts and how exactly international law applies to state use of 
these technologies. The fourth GGE, with an expanded 20 experts, had its first 
meeting in New York in July 2014. The work of the GGEs, as such, continues. 
However, it is arguably the case that ‘as the mandate of the group becomes more 
specific it will increasingly be challenged to find enough common ground on which to 
base a consensual report that adds value to what has already been produced.’134 
 
It is not strictly accurate to claim that ‘[t]he conflicting currents of state views as 
evidenced in the First Committee debates are unlikely to be resolved via the GGE 
process’, as, and as set above, the GGEs have adopted positions accommodating – 
albeit in a somewhat equivocal fashion – of the two main streams of views. However, 
it is still nonetheless the case that while the reports of the GGEs are of constructive 
use states will ultimately ‘have to look to other multilateral, regional and bilateral 
forums to see what might be feasible in terms of confidence building measures and 
agreed norms of behaviour.’135  
                                                
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132  Ibid., at 4. The centrality of the UN Charter in this context has also been noted by several 
commentators: ‘At the heart of the system is the UN Charter. It provides the legal framework which is 
the most accurate way to conceptualize the relationships between its various entities.’ See Maurer, 
supra n.28, at 12.  
133 UNGA A/RES/68/243. 
134 Meyer, supra n.7. 
135 Ibid. 
 17 
 
 
3. The United Nations Security Council 
 
The UN Security Council (UNSC) is the only body able to create binding 
international law. 136  The UNSC’s resolutions to date have not generally been 
concerned with aspects of cyber security. However, it has been active in the field of 
cyber-security, particular terrorism related aspects of it. 
 
On 28 September 2001 the UNSC established the Counter-Terrorism Committee 
through UNSC resolution 1373 (2001) following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001.137 The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force was subsequently created 
by the UN Secretary-General in 2005 to ensure the coordination of the activities 
related to resolution 1373 (2001).138 The Task Force went on to establish various 
Working Groups, one of which was concerned with Countering the Use of the Internet 
for Terrorist Purposes.  
 
The Working Group’s mandate is located within the 2006 United Nations Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy which includes a paragraph on exploring ways and means 
to ‘(a) Coordinate efforts at the international and regional levels to counter terrorism 
in all its forms and manifestations on the Internet; (b) Use the Internet as a tool for 
countering the spread of terrorism, while recognizing that States may require 
assistance in this regard.’139 While the Working Group was established in response to 
the 9/11 attacks it only later became linked to the broader cyber-security debate and 
today consists of various bodies, including Interpol, the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
  
The Working Group has four goals:140 
 
• identify and bring together stakeholders and partners on the abuse of the 
Internet for terrorist purposes, including using the web for radicalization, 
recruitment, training, operational planning, fundraising and other means; 
 
• explore ways in which terrorists use the Internet; 
 
• quantify the threat that this poses and examine options for addressing it at 
national, regional and global levels; and 
 
• examine what role the UN might play. 
 
The work of the Working Group began with a ‘mapping exercise of relevant laws, 
conventions, resources and initiatives’.141 This was based on information provided by 
various Member States, interviews conducted with various stakeholders, and publicly 
available information. A stakeholders’ meeting was held in November 2008 which 
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‘focused on creating common understanding among sectors which may have 
divergent ideas on countering use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, with the 
ultimate aim of determining what if any international action might be appropriate.’142 
 
As a result, the Working Group published its first report in February 2009 which 
analyzed information provided by Member States and reflected the conclusions of the 
stakeholders’ meeting.143 Significantly, it concluded that at that moment there was no 
obvious terrorist threat in the area and that it was not obvious that it was a matter for 
action within the counter-terrorism remit of the UN. It did, however, outline ways 
suggested by Member States by which the UN could further contribute, including 
facilitating Member States sharing of best practices, building a database of research 
into use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, conducting more work on countering 
extremist ideologies, and creating international legal measures aimed at limiting the 
dissemination of terrorist content on the Internet. 
 
In 2010 the Working Group began to build upon the work of the first report by 
addressing legal and technical challenges surrounding the efforts to counter the 
terrorist use of the Internet. The Working Group held two meetings with various 
stakeholders and published a report in May 2011.144 The section on legal aspects 
distinguishes internet-specific and non-internet-specific laws and in doing so 
highlights that there have been three discernable trends: 
 
• states that apply existing cybercrime legislation to terrorist use of the 
Internet 
 
• states that apply existing counter-terrorism legislation to Internet-
related acts; and 
 
• states that have enacted specific legislation on terrorist use of the 
Internet. 
 
Ultimately the report calls for a harmonization of national legislations by 
implementing regional instruments such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime 
or the Commonwealth Model Law on Cybercrime as well as international instruments 
such as the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 
 
A third phase of the Working Group which began in 2011 has focused on the use of 
the Internet to counter the appeal of terrorism, specifically by analyzing the role of 
counter-narratives and effective messengers who can deliver these narratives. A report 
on this issue consisted of a summary of a conference held in Riyadh in January 2011 
on ‘The Use of the Internet to Counter the Appeal of Extremist Violence’.145 The 
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Conference ‘focused on identifying good practices in using the Internet to undermine 
the appeal of terrorism, to expose its lack of legitimacy and its negative impact, and to 
undermine the credibility of its messengers’.146 Key themes included ‘the importance 
of identifying the target audience, crafting effective messages, identifying credible 
messengers, and using appropriate media to reach vulnerable communities.’147 The 
Conference ‘agreed that Governments might not always be best placed to lead this 
work and needed the cooperation of civil society, the private sector, academia, the 
media and victims of terrorism.’148 Importantly, it was also agreed that ‘[g]iven the 
global nature of terrorist narratives and the need to counter them in the same space, 
there was a special role for the United Nations in facilitating discussion and action.’149 
 
 
4. The Economic and Social Council 
 
The third (and final) intergovernmental body of the UN to deal with issues of cyber-
security is the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) which is the principal body 
for coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and recommendations on economic, 
social and environmental issues. ECOSOC has held a general interest in issues of 
cyber-security and related issues. In 2010, it opened its session with a briefing title 
‘Cyber security: emerging threats and challenges’ and the following year it held a 
special event on ‘Cybersecurity and development’.150  However, it is in two of its 
functional commissions – the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs – where most activity has occurred, 
particularly in connection with the criminal use of cyber-space. 
 
 
4.1. The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
 
The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) was established 
by ECOSOC in 1992 and acts as the principal policymaking body of the UN in the 
field of crime prevention and criminal justice.151 The first session of the Commission 
took place in 1992 with its work focusing on, as its name might suggest, crime and 
justice. In this respect, in 1998 the Commission requested the UNGA to include in the 
agenda of the Tenth Crime Congress a workshop on ‘crimes related to the computer 
network’. 152  The following year, in 1999, the Commission also proposed a draft 
resolution for ECOSOC on the ‘Work of the United Nations Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice Programme’ requesting the Secretary-General to conduct a study on 
effective measures that could be taken at the national and international levels to 
prevent and control computer-related crimes in light of the workshop at the Tenth 
Crime Congress and to report on his results at CCPCJ’s tenth session.153 
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The ultimate result of the consideration given to such crimes at the Tenth Crime 
Congress in 2000 was the adoption by the UNGA of the Vienna Declaration on Crime 
and Justice, in which Member States  
 
‘decide[d] to develop action-oriented policy recommendations on the 
prevention and control of computer-related crime, and we invite the 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to undertake work in 
this regard, taking into account the ongoing work in other forums. We also 
commit ourselves to working towards enhancing our ability to prevent, 
investigate and prosecute high-technology and computer-related crime. 154 
 
At the CCPCJ’s tenth session in 2001 a plan of action for implementing the Vienna 
Declaration was adopted including ‘[a]ction against high-technology and computer 
related crime’ which recommended a series of national and international measures.155 
What was noticeable is that up until this point the focus was on computer crime as 
opposed to ‘cyber’ crime and security.156 Indeed, it was only in the CCPCJ’s 2002 
report that the term ‘cyber’ was mentioned for the first time,157 with a call for a UN 
convention on ‘cybercrime’ appearing in its 2004 report.158 However, despite this 
activity it was only in 2010 that cybercrime became a prominent theme in its annual 
reports, with some speakers again bringing up the possibility of global convention 
against cybercrime.159  It was also notable the extent to which cyber issues were 
prominent in the various issues discussed, including in the use of information 
technologies to exploit children, economic fraud and identity-related crime, and 
activities relating to combating cybercrime including technical assistance and 
capacity-building. Subsequent reports have included discussion on, for example, 
cybercrime in connection with the trafficking of cultural property,160 and organized 
crime.161 
Furthermore, ECOSOC and the UNGA requested the CCPCJ to establish, in line with 
paragraph 42 of the Salvador Declaration on Comprehensive Strategies for Global 
Challenges: Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Systems and Their Development 
in a Changing World, an open-ended intergovernmental expert group on 
cybercrime.162 This group was to conduct a comprehensive study of the problem of 
cybercrime and responses to it by Member States, the international community and 
the private sector, including the exchange of information on national legislation, best 
practices, technical assistance and international cooperation, with a view to examining 
options to strengthen existing and to propose new national and international legal or 
other responses to cybercrime. 
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The first session of the group was held from 17 to 21 January 2011.163 The UNGA 
noted with appreciation the work of the Expert Group and encouraged it to enhance its 
efforts to complete its work and to present the outcome of the study to the CCPCJ in 
due course.164 The second session of the group was subsequently held from 25 to 28 
February 2013.165 The report includes discussion on issues such as legislation and 
frameworks, criminalization, law enforcement and investigations, electronic evidence 
and criminal justice, international cooperation and prevention. 
 
4.2. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
 
The Commission on Narcotic Drugs has focused on the use and abuse of the Internet 
only from a drug trafficking perspective in line with its functional mandate and did so 
as early as 1996.166 In 2000 the Commission eventually adopted a resolution solely 
focused upon and titled ‘Internet’ which was brought to the attention of ECOSOC.167 
After the adoption of this resolution there was no further specific resolution on the 
internet or cyber issues, although repeated references were made to it as part of the 
Commission’s discussions. However, in 2004, in reference to the 2000 resolution, the 
Commission prepared a draft resolution for ECOSOC on the ‘Sale of internationally 
controlled licit drugs to individuals via the internet’.168 In 2005, the Commission 
prepared a further resolution for ECOSOC titled ‘Strengthening international 
cooperation in order to prevent the use of the Internet to commit drug-related 
crimes’169 while in 2007 prepared a similar resolution on ‘International cooperation in 
preventing the illegal distribution of internationally controlled licit substances via the 
internet.’170 
 
5. Subsidiary Organs and Specialized Agencies 
Aside from the intergovernmental bodies found within the UN Charter, there are 
several subsidiary organs and specialized agencies of the UN that work the field of 
cybersecurity. Although they are not expressly mentioned in the UN Charter they find 
their legal base there. Indeed, under Article 22 of the UN Charter ‘[t]he General 
Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the 
performance of its functions’ while Article 57 states that the ‘various specialized 
agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement … shall be brought into 
relationship with the United Nations’. Of the many that exist, those key in the context 
of cybersecurity are the International Telecommunications Unit, the United Nations 
Institute for Disarmament Research, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime. Although an extensive analysis of their individual roles and functions is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, their key functions in connection with cybersecurity 
will be briefly addressed. 
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5.1. International Telecommunications Unit  
 
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the UN specialized agency for 
ICTs and has most responsibility for practical aspects of cyber-security. While it 
existed prior to the UN’s founding in 1945 it subsequently joined the UN system as a 
specialized agency under Article 57 of the UN Charter. The ITU is not only a forum 
for discussion of cybersecurity issues, and thus advances the broad agenda set by its 
member states by focuses on specific initiatives, but also plays a key role role in 
setting technical standards. 
 
The ITU Secretary-General launched the Global Cyber-Security Agenda in May 2007 
which he described as being an ‘international framework for cyber-security’.171 A key 
part of this was the establishment of a high-level group of experts on cyber-security. 
The group held three meetings between 2007 and 2008 before publishing its Global 
Strategic Report in 2008,172 which focused on five areas 
 
• Legal measures; 
 
• Technical and procedural measures; 
 
• Organizational meausres; 
 
• Capacity building; and 
 
• International cooperation.  
 
The recommendations of the group of experts to the ITU included 
 
• developing model legislation for member states to adopt. The ITU has also 
developed a tool kit for cyber-crime legislation with sample language 
including explanatory comments which could form the basis for a 
harmonization of cybercrime laws; 
 
• the creation of a ‘Cyber-security Readiness Index’; 
 
• a framework for national infrastructure protection; and 
 
• a conceptualization of what a culture of cyber-security could be understood to 
mean. 
 
The ITU Secretary-General has taken on a particularly visible role in the cyber 
security agenda of the ITU. For example, at the 2010 World Telecom Development 
Conference in Hyderabad he proposed a ‘no first attack vow’ for cyberspace and that 
states ‘should undertake not to harbour cyberterrorists and attackers in their country 
                                                
171 Maurer, supra n.28, at 30. 
172 See http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/global_strategic_report/global_strategic_report.pdf 
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unpunished’173 as well as drafting five principles of cyber-peace.174 More recently in 
2014, the ITU, along with the United Nations Children’s Fund, and partners of the 
Child Online Protection Initiative, released updated Guidelines to strengthen online 
protection for children. 175  The ITU’s initiatives in the context of Child Online 
Protection have ‘been identified as an effort whose merit all states agree on and where 
trust can be built so that socialization effects could potentially produce positive spill 
over effects for the broader cyber-security agenda.’176 
 
 
5.2. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 
 
The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDR) is a voluntarily 
funded autonomous institute within the UN and generates ideas and promotes action 
on disarmament and security. It was one of the first UN bureaucracies to become 
involved in the issue of cyber-security and today its ‘cyber work aims to carry out 
policy-focused capacity-building at the national, regional and multilateral level, as 
well as relevant research and analysis.’177 
 
It has hosted two conferences relating to the discussions in the UNGA’s First 
Committee. In 1999, the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs funded 
a two-day discussion meeting on ‘Developments in the field of information and 
telecommunications in the context of international security’.178 This conference was 
titled the same as the resolution introduced by Russia a year earlier and highlighted 
the different primary concerns that states had at that time. In 2008 Russia then funded 
a conference on ‘Information & Communication Technologies and International 
Security’ with the objective being ‘[t]o examine the existing and potential threats 
originating from the hostile use of information and communication technologies, 
discuss the unique challenges posed by ICTs to international security and possible 
responses.’179 Today, as well as acting as a consultant to the GGEs, it has also hosted 
three cyber-security conferences, with the most recent in 2014 focusing on preventing 
cyber conflict.  
 
 
5.3. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
 
Although cybersecurity is not formally within the domain of the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Third Committee of the UNGA first 
requested for UNODC to become involved in technical assistance specifically relating 
to ‘cyber crime’ in 2008.180 Member States officially requested UNODC to work on 
the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes for the first time at the 20th  session of the 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in April 2011 after it was first 
                                                
173 H. Wegener, ‘Cyber Peace’, in International Telecommunication Union and World Federation of 
Scientists, The Quest for Cyber Peace, January 2011, at 81, available at 
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mentioned at the 19th session the year before. UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Unit 
contributed to a CTITF publication in 2012 for law enforcement investigators and 
criminal justice officers in connection with cases involving ‘[t]he use of the internet 
for terrorist purposes.’181 It also took the lead in the 2013 Global Programme on 
Cybercrime which, as described above,182 had been initiated by the CCPCJ and which 
aimed to assist Member States in strengthening existing national and international 
legal responses to cybercrime. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
As with many areas of international life, events within the UN in the context of cyber 
security have arguably been overtaken by events on the ground, and the UN is 
struggling to catch up. The functioning of the UN in this or, indeed, any area of 
activity, is down to the will and ability of its Member States. While there remains a 
clear divide within the international community regarding the focus of any emerging 
regulatory framework and the underlying approach to govern cyberspace there has 
been a discernable shift in the will amongst states to take action to regulate activity 
within cyberspace in some form. Indeed, we have witnessed a distinct shift in activity, 
and perhaps momentum towards something substantial and meaningful being 
achieved within and by the UN.  
 
Finnemore and Sikkink perceptively observed that ‘[n]orms do not appear out of thin 
air; they are actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or 
desirable behaviour in their community’.183 While this chapter has only been able to 
offer a somewhat limited account of the activities of the UN and its Member States in 
this area, achievements can be seen in the number of UNGA resolutions adopted in 
various committees, the increasing number of sponsors of these resolutions, the 
progressive work of the GGEs, and the work on the issue of cyber security taking 
place across a range of organs, agencies and bodies. Furthermore, while certain 
concerns have been continuously repeated in the UNGA since 1998, in particular the 
need for advancing ICTs but with caution over their the dual-use nature, there has also 
been continuous, if sometimes sluggish, progress in finding common ground and 
elaborating upon it. Indeed, the need for practical cooperation between not just states 
but also between states and other stakeholders, the need to develop common 
understandings of acceptable state behaviour, and the need for confidence-building, 
transparency and capacity-building measures have become themes cemented most 
visibly within the discourse of the GGEs but are also discernable in the work of the 
other UN organs. Dialogue and communication between the various UN organs, 
bodies and groups now needs to be improved to enable further integrated concerted 
action and norm development. 
 
Yet, it would be shortsighted to think that a regulatory framework can emerge solely 
within the forum of the UN. Indeed the UN itself has continuously noted the valuable 
efforts that have been made by international organizations and regional entities in this 
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area, such as the African Union, ASEAN, the Council of Europe, ECOWAS, the EU, 
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to name a few. However, states have also 
begun to act bilaterally in seeking to cooperate, come to common understandings, and 
build confidence and transparency between them in their operations in cyberspace. A 
good example of this is the working group on cyber security recently established 
between the US and China. 184  With US concerns regarding a new international 
regulatory framework in the form of a treaty still visible, the application of existing 
international rules and norms along with the existence of softer, albeit complex, 
regulation in this area looks set to continue for some time yet. 
                                                
184 BBC News, ‘US and China to set up cyber security working group’, 13 April 2013, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-22137950. 
